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Abstract
The contemporary state of corporate law in the United States is one that is skewed toward
the archaic principle of shareholder primacy. This narrow conception of corporate purpose has
resulted in governance mechanisms that tend to overlook the many stakeholders that are affected
by, and, in turn, affect the bottom line of modern corporations. In the wake of the recently pro-
posed Accountable Capitalism Act, this Note investigates the viability of adopting a system of
mandated worker board representation—codetermination—in the United States. The Note em-
ploys a comparative analysis of the German and Swedish experiences with codetermination, and
then evaluates the policy, efficiency, and legal arguments made by prominent scholars and experts
in the field of comparative corporate law. This Note begins by examining the history of code-
termination in Germany and Sweden. It then details several pertinent developments in United
States corporate law and reflects on how these developments have affected the economy. Next,
it introduces relevant arguments for and against codetermination that are rooted in economic and
legal considerations. This Note then proposes a set of parameters for the adoption of codetermi-
nation in the United States—primarily maintaining a single-tier board structure and mandating a
nationwide, industry-wide application. Finally, due to the unpredictability of transplanting foreign
governance mechanisms, it calls for additional research and constructive debate on the topic.
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ABSTRACT 
The contemporary state of corporate law in the United States is one 
that is skewed toward the archaic principle of shareholder primacy. 
This narrow conception of corporate purpose has resulted in 
governance mechanisms that tend to overlook the many stakeholders 
that are affected by, and, in turn, affect the bottom line of modern 
corporations. In the wake of the recently proposed Accountable 
Capitalism Act, this Note investigates the viability of adopting a 
system of mandated worker board representation—codetermination—
in the United States. The Note employs a comparative analysis of the 
German and Swedish experiences with codetermination, and then 
evaluates the policy, efficiency, and legal arguments made by 
prominent scholars and experts in the field of comparative corporate 
law. This Note begins by examining the history of codetermination in 
Germany and Sweden. It then details several pertinent developments 
in United States corporate law and reflects on how these developments 
have affected the economy. Next, it introduces relevant arguments for 
and against codetermination that are rooted in economic and legal 
considerations. This Note then proposes a set of parameters for the 
adoption of codetermination in the United States—primarily 
maintaining a single-tier board structure and mandating a nationwide, 
industry-wide application. Finally, due to the unpredictability of 
transplanting foreign governance mechanisms, it calls for additional 
research and constructive debate on the topic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over a century ago, Otto von Gierke warned that the working class 
was “threatened to be deprived of their economic personality by the 
development of the capitalist large enterprise.”1 While von Gierke uttered 
those words in a different context, the message could not be more befitting 
to the contemporary state of the U.S. economy. 
U.S. corporate law has developed in a manner that continually 
expands the rights afforded to corporate entities which, in turn, 
incentivizes corporate ownership.2 As a result, modern corporations exert 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance 
Externalities, EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 164 (Margaret M. Blair & 
Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (quoting Otto van Gierke’s 1868 writing). 
 2. See generally The Rights of Corporations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/opinion/22tue1.html [https://perma.cc/9BWN-2T 
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an unprecedented level of influence on the global economy. 3  Their 
products are cemented into the U.S. psyche and have become integral 
features of the most intimate facets of the culture and, thus, the economy.4 
Corporate actions impact both stakeholders and society at large. For 
example, the opening of a new factory has a positive impact on a variety 
of groups—shareholders benefit from an increase in share value, the 
assets of new hires and their nuclear families multiply, and the local 
economy experiences a rise in activity. 
Control over corporate decision-making, however, is reserved for 
shareholders and appointed directors.5 Accordingly, the fate of the many 
stakeholders affected by corporate actions rests in the hands of a select 
few who often have different interests.6 This discrepancy has not escaped 
the attention of contemporary legislators, as several have integrated 
corporate governance reform into their policymaking agenda.7 One such 
example is Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act.8 In 
an effort to address corporate accountability, Senator Warren proposed a 
system of governance in which worker representation—
codetermination—would be mandatory and the fiduciary duties of 
corporate directors would be expanded to include stakeholders other than 
shareholders.9 
                                                                                                                 
4M]; When Did Companies Become People? Excavating the Legal Evolution, NPR (July 
28, 2014, 4:57 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=33 
5288388 [https://perma.cc/B92E-5CQB]. 
 3. Brian Roach, Corporate Power in a Global Economy, GLOB. DEV. & ENV’T 
INST., TUFTS U. 1 (2007) http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/education_materials/modules/ 
corporate_power_in_a_global_economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LVR-BJXL]. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016) (providing that “[t]he business 
and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board 
of directors.”). 
 6. See Fabian Brandt & Konstantinos Georgiou, Shareholders vs. Stakeholders 
Capitalism 36-37 (Spring 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School: Legal Scholarship Repository) (suggesting that some 
corporate directors protect a select group of stakeholders’ interests instead of the entire 
class of shareholders). 
 7. See, e.g., Jonathan Ford & Jim Pickard, The Four Key Proposals in May’s 
Boardroom Overhaul, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/964a3d4 
c-8cc5-11e7-9084-d0c17942ba93 [https://perma.cc/GUY9-V884]. 
 8. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018). 
 9. Id. 
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Through a comparative analysis of legal developments in Europe and 
the United States, this Note reflects on the legal and economic theories 
advanced by codetermination and, thus, evaluates its practical viability in 
the United States. Part I details the historical development of 
codetermination, which has occurred almost exclusively in Europe. Part 
II presents relevant arguments for the adoption of codetermination given 
its practicality, efficiency, and legality. Part III reflects on the goals that 
worker representation advances and, accordingly, suggests a course of 
action for its adoption in the United States. 
I. ORIGINS 
Codetermination was first conceived and adopted in Europe, and 
continues to exist primarily there. 10  Germany was one of the first 
countries to consider implementing co-determination, having debated the 
topic at the country’s first democratic assembly—the Frankfurt 
Parliament of 1848 and 1849. 11  As a result, the vast majority of 
codetermination research has been conducted in the context of Germany’s 
experience with the system.12 The most notable progress made outside of 
Germany has been in Scandinavia, where Norway, Sweden, and Denmark 
have each adopted a system of worker representation unique to their 
socioeconomic conditions.13 
A. GERMAN ORIGINS 
German codetermination operates in two distinct ways. First, it exists 
at the shop level through workers’ councils; second, it exists at the 
                                                                                                                 
 10. For a comprehensive list of participating countries and their respective worker 
representation systems, see WORKER PARTICIPATION, www.worker-participation.eu (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/WK76-KZ78]. 
 11. Justin Fox, Why German Corporate Boards Include Workers, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 24, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-24/ 
why-german-corporate-boards-include-workers-for-co-determination [https://perma.cc/ 
GB4U-H4K2]. 
 12. See infra Section I.A. 
 13. See generally Steen Thomsen, Caspar Rose & Dorte Kronborg, Employee 
Representation and Board Size in the Nordic Countries, 42 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 471 
(detailing the history which led to the current system of worker representation in the 
Nordic countries). 
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corporate level through the representation of workers on supervisory 
boards.14 The workers’ councils address standard collective bargaining 
matters, while supervisory boards oversee companies’ policy-based 
strategic decision-making.15 
Some form of worker representation has existed in Germany for well 
over one hundred years.16 As early as July 1891, the German legislature 
enacted laws allowing for the creation of workers’ councils on a voluntary 
basis. 17  While the 1891 enactments only dealt with shop-level 
representation, representation soon rose into the upper levels of 
management. Germany first moved toward the current conception of 
codetermination in 1922, when the government passed legislation 
requiring that worker representatives be appointed to the supervisory 
boards of joint-stock companies. 18  In 1934, Germany’s Nazi regime 
rescinded the laws because the ideologies on which they rested were at 
odds with those of the regime itself.19 
Codetermination returned to prominence, however, after World War 
II and the rise and fall of fascism in Germany.20 Politicians believed that 
the Nazi regime excelled largely due to its alliance with private capital, 
particularly the coal and steel industries. 21  To prevent the continued 
intertwining of politics and private capital, many thought the newly-
                                                                                                                 
 14. See Pistor, supra note 1, at 165-66. 
 15. It is important to note that German companies operate with a dual-tiered board 
system, as opposed to the single-tiered system that is a staple in the United States. The 
dual-board structure consists of a supervisory board and a management board, which the 
supervisory board appoints and supervises. The supervisory board oversees the long-term 
policy and strategy of the firm, while the management board is in charge of the day-to-
day operations. See Wolf-Georg Ringe, German Versus Nordic Board Models: Form, 
Function, and Convergence, 65 NORDIC J. BUS. 27, 30-31 (2016). 
 16. See, e.g., Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination Bargains: The History of 
German Corporate and Labour Law 13 (London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci. Working Paper 
10/2015) (detailing the adoption and subsequent development of codetermination in 
Germany). 
 17. Gesetz Betreffend Abänderung der Gewerbeordnung [Law Concerning 
Modification of the Industrial Code], June 1, 1891, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL] at 159, 
§ 134h (Ger.). 
 18. Gesetz über die Entsendung über Betriebsratsmitglieder in den Aufsichtsrat 
[Supervisory Council Act], Feb. 15, 1922, REICHSGESETZBLATT, Teil I [RGBL I] at 209 
(Ger.). 
 19. See McGaughey, supra note 16, at 30. 
 20. See id. at 34. 
 21. Id. 
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established political democracy should match an “economic democracy” 
that constrains the use of private capital.22 This line of thinking, paired 
with the desire to maintain the economic powerhouses of the coal mining 
and steel industries (generally categorized in Germany as the 
Montanindustrie or Montan industry), resulted in the current regime of 
codetermination in Germany.23 
The existing German codetermination legislation regulates two 
major factions of the market: the Montan industry,24 and all companies 
outside of the Montan industry that employ more than 500 people.25 
Because the empirical data regarding Montan codetermination is both 
limited in scope and of questionable accuracy, this Note focuses on 
German codetermination as it exists outside of the Montan industry.26 
The Works Constitution Act of 1952 (the “1952 Act”) introduced the 
current conception of German codetermination.27 The 1952 Act mandated 
that companies—other than those in the Montan industry—with between 
500 and 2,000 employees allow their workers to appoint one third of the 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Pistor, supra note 1, at 167. 
 23. McGaughey, supra note 16, at 36. 
 24. The Montanmitbestimmungsgeset [MontanMitbestG] [Codetermination Act of 
1951], May 21, 1951, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 347 (Ger.). This Act 
regulates the Montan industry and calls for an even split of shareholder and worker 
representatives on their boards. 
 25. The Works Constitution Act governed non-Montan industry companies that 
employ between 500 and 2,000 workers, while the Codetermination Act of 1976 governs 
companies with over 2,000 workers. See Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] [Works 
Constitution Act of 1952], Oct. 11, 1952, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 681 
(Ger.); see also Mitbestimmungsgsetz [MitbestG] [Codetermination Act of 1976], May 
4, 1976, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1153 (Ger.). The 1952 Act was 
supplanted by the One-Third Participation Act of 2004, which mandates essentially the 
same conditions for the purposes of this Note. The One-Third Participation Act requires 
that German companies which employ between 500 and 2,000 workers must grant them 
1/3 of their board seats. §§ 1 & 4 Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz [DrittelbG] [One-Third 
Participation Act], May 18, 2004, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBl I] at 974 (Ger.). 
 26. Experts argue two main reasons that the data is largely irrelevant for fiscal 
efficiency reasons. First, because the Montan industry was categorically affected, there 
was no control set of companies to weigh results against. Second, the research focused 
mostly on subjective reporting of workers’ self-esteem. See Pistor, supra note 1, at 169-
70. 
 27. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] [Works Constitution Act of 1952], Oct. 11, 
1952, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 681 (Ger.). 
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supervisory board.28 Because the 1952 Act was limited in its application 
to firms of a certain size, it was not long before the legislature moved to 
expand the reach of codetermination requirements. The Codetermination 
Act of 1976 requires that all companies outside of the Montan industry 
with more than 2,000 workers allow the workforce to appoint one half of 
the directors who sit on the supervisory board.29 This system is referred 
to as “quasi-parity codetermination” because, although employees make 
up half of the board, shareholders have the right to appoint the chairman, 
who has the authority to cast the tie-breaking vote in a deadlock.30 
Despite the ability of shareholders to influence decisive tie-breaking 
votes, workers retain a considerable amount of influence over company 
policy through their board representatives.31 This leverage is rooted in (1) 
their ability to influence the makeup of the board; (2) their increased 
access to information, which prevents shareholder representatives from 
abusing their power; and (3) their ability to withhold votes and essentially 
veto company decisions.32 
It is important to note several characteristics unique to the German 
system. While a dual-board system consisting of both a supervisory board 
and management board is not unique to Germany, 33  it certainly is 
unexplored territory in the U.S. context, which has always consisted of 
single-tiered boards.34 Because German shareholders and workers do not 
directly appoint the members of the management board, the board’s 
decision-making process is insulated from their control to a certain 
degree. Additionally, companies in the German market operate with a 
well-established system of collective bargaining, which sets a clear 
division between the subject matter debated by workers’ unions and that 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. 
 29. Mitbestimmungsgsetz [MitbestG] [Codetermination Act of 1976], May 4, 1976, 
BGBL I §§ 1, 7. (Ger.). 
 30. Id. § 29. 
 31. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 90 (3rd ed. 2017). 
 32. Id. at 91. 
 33. See Thomsen, Rose & Kronborg, supra note 13. 
 34. Frank Chantayan, An Explanation of American and German Corporate Law 
Norms, 16 ST. JOHNS J. CIV. RTS. ECON. DEV. 431, 436-37 (2002). 
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which is debated by the codetermined supervisory boards.35 The workers’ 
unions negotiate typical core matters of collective bargaining outside of 
the company’s enterprise on an industry-wide level.36 These negotiations 
occur regularly, and bind companies in entire regions of the country.37 On 
the other hand, the representatives on the supervisory board influence 
long-term policy matters, separate from those decided through collective 
bargaining.38 
B. ADOPTION IN SCANDINAVIA 
The Scandinavian countries are among the most pragmatic adopters 
of codetermination outside of Germany. Though each respective 
Scandinavian country has adopted systems with varying features, this 
Note focuses on the Swedish system, as it operates with what is 
effectively a closely controlled, single-tiered board structure—most 
similar to the United States.39 
Scholars often attribute the origin of worker representation in 
Sweden to the rise of the Social Democratic Party (the “SAP”) in the early 
twentieth century.40 Having remained largely in power from the mid-
1930s through the mid-1980s, the SAP had a prominent impact on 
Swedish socioeconomic policy. 41  The party’s socioeconomic agenda 
relied heavily on the belief that pure capitalism is not desirable, and 
instead, those in power should pursue an “economic democracy.”42 The 
SAP envisioned “a stakeholder form of socialism that was more efficient 
than pure capitalism because it contained elements of rational planning 
that would eliminate the waste that irrational, short-sighted markets 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See Paul Davies, Efficiency Arguments for the Collective Representation of 
Workers: A Sketch, in THE AUTONOMY OF LABOUR LAW 383-84 (Alan Bogg et al. eds., 
2015). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 385. 
 39. Board Level Representation in Sweden, EUROPEAN TRADE UNION INST., 
https://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Sweden/ 
Board-level-Representation [https://perma.cc/M2LD-KFPU] (last visited Mar. 6, 2019). 
 40. See Peter Hogfeldt, The History and Politics of Social Ownership in Sweden, in 
A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 538-46 (Randall K. 
Morck ed., 2005). 
 41. Id. at 519. 
 42. Id. at 539. 
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create, like unemployment and volatile investment cycles.”43 The SAP 
believed that the pillar of successful capitalism was a steady flow of 
investment that produced socially-beneficial, long-term growth.44 As a 
result, policymakers should recognize that workers are not merely the 
means of production, but rather, private actors with valid socioeconomic 
needs whose fulfilment—or lack thereof—will have deep and lasting 
effects on society.45 
Swedish labor policy in the mid-1900s was influenced heavily by the 
history of cooperation between the SAP and the capitalists that controlled 
the largest, most economically-relevant companies. 46  This level of 
cooperation first came to fruition in approximately 1938, when 
policymakers adopted two pivotal strategies. 47  First, the 
Saltsjöbadsavtalet accord afforded new protections to workers and 
cemented procedures meant to limit negative externalities produced by 
companies. 48  By stressing the common economic goals of large 
companies and their workers, a general spirit of cooperation developed.49 
Second, corporate tax reform granted free depreciation allowances for 
machines and equipment.50 Because this policy mainly benefited large, 
capital-intensive companies, it furthered the spirit of cooperation between 
the SAP and capitalists. 51  These reforms and the cooperation that 
followed led to a period of socioeconomic prosperity dubbed the Swedish 
“Golden Age.”52 
The policies adopted by the SAP were not without their drawbacks. 
While the policies benefitted large enterprises, they also stymied the 
formation of new companies and ignored the importance of small 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 539-41. 
 47. Id. at 541. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. This was followed by an accelerated depreciation allowance in 1958, which 
was even more favorable to capitalists. 
 51. Id. For an analysis on how depreciation allowances benefit large companies, see 
Bruce Bartlett, Depreciation’s Place in Tax Policy, NY TIMES: ECONOMIX (Sep. 10, 
2013), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/depreciations-place-in-tax-
policy/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/778U-S7DK]. 
 52. See Hogfeldt, supra note 40, at 545. 
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business.53 Additionally, unequal working conditions became rampant 
even in the largest enterprises, which led to a long and bitter working 
strike in 1969.54 Mounting criticism stemming from the 1969 strike, along 
with an economic depression triggered by an international oil crisis, led 
political incumbents to propose increasingly radical redistributive 
policies. 55  Though the SAP lost the 1976 election, the sociopolitical 
climate inevitably headed toward the economic democracy proposed 
decades earlier.56 That same year, Sweden adopted the Codetermination 
Act of 1976 and, thus, took the first step toward their contemporary model 
of worker representation.57 
The Act on Board Representation for Employees in Private 
Employment, codified in 1987 (the “1987 Act”), created what developed 
into the current system of worker representation in Sweden.58 Under the 
1987 Act, companies that employ over twenty-five people are required to 
allow workers to appoint two members to the board of directors. 59 
Companies in certain sectors of the market with over 1,000 employees 
must allow on the board three worker representatives.60 Although there is 
no specified percentage requirement of worker board members in Sweden 
like there is in Germany, recent studies have found that workers tend to 
make up approximately thirty percent of the board seats in Swedish 
companies.61 Nevertheless, worker representatives may never constitute 
the majority of a company’s board of directors.62 Local unions nominate 
the worker representatives, and the unions usually have collective 
agreements with the companies involved. 63  Although worker 
representatives can vote on most issues introduced to the board, they lack 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 545, n.12. 
 55. Id. at 545. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See generally LAG OM STYRELSEREPRESENTATION FÖR DE PRIVATANSTÄLLDA 
(Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1987:1245) (Swed.). 
 59. 4 § Svensk författningssamling (SFS 1987:1245) (Swed.). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Board Level Representation in Sweden, supra note 39. 
 62. § 4 Svensk författningssamling (SFS 1987:1245) (Swed.). 
 63. See Board Level Representation in Sweden, supra note 39. 
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veto power and cannot vote on issues that are part of collective bargaining 
done by the local unions.64 
Finally, the Swedish system of corporate governance is marked by a 
“strict hierarchy between the different levels of command.”65 The degree 
to which management is insulated under the German system does not exist 
and, thus, directors exercise strict control over management in Sweden.66 
Accordingly, the shareholders exercise close control over companies 
through their directors.67  The close nexus of control prevalent in the 
Swedish system enables it to operate in a manner that functionally is 
equivalent to the single-tiered system of the United States. 
C. A FUTURE IN THE UNITED STATES? 
Corporate law in the United States largely results from state-created 
legislation and case law.68 The most widely accepted view of corporate 
purpose is that corporations are to be run for the pecuniary benefit of the 
shareholders.69 It is not completely clear, however, how directors should 
pursue this pecuniary benefit. The Delaware General Corporation Law 
(the “DGCL”), widely considered an authority on U.S. corporate law, is 
relatively silent regarding corporate purpose.70 Though the DGCL sets up 
boundaries for director power and liability, and indirectly imparts 
fiduciary duties, it does not define corporate purpose as creating a 
pecuniary benefit.71 
In contrast, case law provides a more clear and nuanced definition of 
what a corporate purpose should be. In the oft-mentioned Dodge v. Ford, 
a Michigan court found that Henry Ford breached his fiduciary duty to 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Ringe, supra note 15, at 33. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Richard W. Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and 
Investor Protection, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 198 (1958). 
 69. See, e.g., David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. 
L.J. 181, 183 (2013) (explaining that while some prominent scholars argue that 
companies may operate to pursue profits for stakeholders other than shareholders, the 
most widely accepted view is “that corporate boards are supposed to pursue profits for 
shareholders and that directors have neither the obligation nor the right to pursue other 
interests.”). 
 70. Id. at 185. 
 71. Id. 
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shareholders when he sought to reinvest profits into the company to 
increase wages and decrease prices, as opposed to issuing discretionary 
dividends.72 Despite its prevalence in law school curricula, scholars often 
dispute the significance of Dodge, as Delaware courts have yet to cite it 
as authority on the issue of corporate purpose.73 Alternatively, a line of 
now-famous takeover cases decided by the Delaware courts provides 
insight for how to define corporate purpose.74 
In Unocal v. Mesa, the Delaware Supreme Court held that director 
power is derived from a duty to protect the “corporate enterprise, which 
includes stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived.”75 Accordingly, 
in developing a reasonable anti-takeover plan, directors should consider 
the “inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, 
questions of illegality, the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than 
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the 
community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of 
securities being offered in the exchange.”76 
While the Unocal opinion gave the impression that directors could 
stray from shareholder primacy, the Delaware Supreme Court held 
otherwise in Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings. 77  Revlon 
clarified that the standard announced in Unocal did not authorize directors 
to make decisions for the sole benefit of stakeholders other than the 
shareholders themselves. 78  Though directors can act with other 
beneficiaries in mind, such actions are permissible only if they are 
“rationally related” to the benefits accruing to shareholders.79  Revlon 
clearly demonstrates that shareholder primacy is at the center of Delaware 
law. Recently, the Delaware Chancery Court emphasized the idea of 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Dodge v. Ford, 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919) (“A business corporation is organized 
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors 
are to be employed for that end.”). 
 73. Yosifon, supra note 69, at 188. 
 74. See discussion infra pp. 12-13. 
 75. Unocal v. Mesa, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
 76. Id. at 955. 
 77. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
 78. Id. at 176 (finding that defensive maneuvers taken to protect creditors were 
inappropriate). 
 79. Id. (holding that “while concern for various corporate constituencies is proper 
when addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited by the requirement that there 
be some rationally related benefit accruing to the shareholders.”). 
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shareholder primacy as developed by the Unocal and Revlon holdings. In 
eBay v. Newmark, the court held that when a corporation is organized as 
for-profit, directors’ fiduciary duties bind them to “promote the value of 
the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”80 
Though there is some ambiguity as to what constitutes value creation 
for shareholders, the reality is that modern directors are incentivized to 
enhance the monetary value of shares. Milton Friedman promoted this 
concept, staunchly endorsing the idea that the most efficient economy is 
one in which companies operate with the end goal of increasing profits.81 
Accordingly, directors making decisions on behalf of the company as 
fiduciaries must exercise the highest level of loyalty and care in the 
pursuit of advancing shareholders’ interests, which are often primarily 
monetary.82 
The general acceptance of shareholder value maximization has had 
a number of marked effects on the U.S. economy, beginning with an 
undeniable increase in the value of corporate ownership.83 Empirical data 
reveals that, while share value has drastically increased, book value has 
remained relatively stagnant.84 This is reflected in the average value of 
Tobin’s Q, which historically has been measured at a value well below 
one in many developed countries, including Germany.85 On the other 
hand, the U.S. average has been much closer to one since it took off in the 
mid-1980s, actually soaring and remaining above one for nearly a 
decade.86 Thus, U.S. firms are providing higher shareholder value when 
compared to German and Swedish firms with similar book values. 
                                                                                                                 
 80. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. 2010). 
 81. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG. 1 (Sep. 13, 1970), at 6. 
 82. See, e.g., Note, Christopher Yeager, At Least Somewhat Exaggerated: How 
Reports of the Death of Delaware’s Duty of Care Don’t Tell the Whole Story, 103 
GEORGETOWN L. J. 1387, 1388-89 (describing how directors owe fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and care to their corporation’s shareholders and must pursue, in good faith, the 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders rather than the directors’ own interests). 
 83. See, e.g., FACUNDO ALVAREDO ET AL., WORLD INEQUALITY REPORT 87 (2018). 
 84. Id. at 86. 
 85. Tobin’s Q is equivalent to a firm’s market value divided by its book value. See 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
833 n. 150 (2005); see also Thomas Piketty & Gabriel Zucman, Capital is Back: Wealth-
Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700–2010, 129 Q. J. ECON. 1255 (2014). 
 86. Piketty & Zucman, supra note 85, at 1280-82. 
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The spoils of the increased value of corporate ownership, however, 
have been claimed almost exclusively by a select faction of the 
population. 87  Empirical research shows that the top ten percent of 
households own ninety-three percent of the outstanding shares in the 
United States. 88  Wealth inequality in the United States reflects these 
findings, as the average CEO of a large company now makes over three 
hundred times what the average worker makes—up from forty-two times 
in 1980.89 Though this figure does not reflect the average stockholder, it 
illustrates the disparity in wealth distribution in the United States. 
Professor William Lazonick posits that this is a result of companies 
adopting “value-extracting” strategies, which involve cutting costs by all 
means necessary and distributing the freed-up capital to the shareholders 
through instruments such as stock buybacks.90 
Mandatory codetermination has never been introduced in the United 
States. Though recent legislative developments have seen some 
jurisdictions permit corporations to incorporate and operate with the 
purpose of creating a net social gain,91 the majority of companies in the 
United States continue to avoid operating with such a business model.92 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to 
2016: Has Middle Class Wealth Recovered? 53 (N.Y.U. Dep’t Econ., Working Paper 
No. 24085, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3082268 [https 
://perma.cc/D954-J6K3]. 
 88. Id. 
 89. CEO-To-Worker Pay Ratio Ballooned 1,000 Percent Since 1950: Report, 
HUFFPOST (Apr. 30, 2013, 10:01 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ceo-to-worker-
pay-ratio_n_3184623 [https://perma.cc/Q2G8-QSK3]. 
 90. See William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sep. 
2014), https://hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity [https://perma.cc/54VL-R7U 
S]. 
 91. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362. Corporations that operate for the purpose 
of creating a net social gain, as opposed to primarily creating value for shareholders, are 
referred to as “benefit corporations” or “b-corps.” GENERAL QUESTIONS, BENEFIT CORP., 
https://benefitcorp.net/faq [https://perma.cc/GK32-FGBM] (last visited Apr. 21, 2019). 
 92. Though some states like Delaware and New York permit this, very few 
companies have voluntarily chosen to operate in this way. This may be due to perceived 
drawbacks or simply a lack of experience with the system. Notable high-profile 
exceptions are Patagonia, Warby Parker, Ben & Jerry’s, and Etsy, which have decades of 
combined experience operating as public benefit corporations. For further discussion and 
analysis of high-profile U.S. companies operating for public benefit, see Mary Mazzoni, 
3P Weekend: 12 B Corps Leading Their Industries, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Dec. 9, 2016), 
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In August 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts introduced 
the Accountable Capitalism Act (the “Act”).93 The Act, which is very 
similar to recent stakeholder protection trends emerging in Anglo-Saxon 
nations, proposes several shifts in corporate governance 94  to address 
mounting national concern over uneven wealth distribution, which many 
believe stems from the doctrine of shareholder primacy.95 
The Act mandates the creation of an “Office of United States 
Corporations,” which would operate as a national registry to oversee 
corporations with over $1 billion in annual profits.96  While a federal 
registry seems benign on its face, it actually lays the groundwork for the 
substantive requirements of the Act.97 All companies with over $1 billion 
in annual revenue would be deemed “United States Corporations” and, 
thus, required to adhere to several requirements that radically depart from 
current norms.98 
First, United States Corporations must operate with the purpose of 
creating a “general public benefit.”99 When making strategic decisions, 
their directors must account for the interests of the workforce, the 
consumers, and the global environment. 100  Second, in order to make 
                                                                                                                 
https://www.triplepundit.com/2016/12/b-corps-leading-their-industries/ [https://perma.c 
c/M642-ML4A]. 
 93. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Congr. (2018). 
 94. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, Elizabeth Warren Has a Plan to Save Capitalism, 
VOX (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17683022/elizabeth-warren-
accountable-capitalism-corporations [https://perma.cc/3XL8-MVJS]. 
 95. The last decade has seen a marked shift toward worker representation in political 
rhetoric. One of the key policies advanced by Theresa May in her run for office was 
mandated worker representation at board level. See We Can Make Britain a Country that 
Works for Everyone, CONSERVATIVES (July 11, 2016), http://press.conservatives.com/ 
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EL6-BQ4E]. Though she eventually backtracked on those plans, the policy struck a chord 
with other U.K. politicians such as Jeremy Corbyn, who is currently advocating for a 
nationwide mandate. See Ashley Cowburn, Workers to Make up One Third of Company 
Board Members Under Labour, Jeremy Corbyn Vows, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 23, 2018, 
9:15 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-workers-
boards-labour-conference-one-third-union-a8550946.html [https://perma.cc/M7DR-TH 
EJ]. 
 96. S. 3348 § 3. 
 97. Id. §§ 3-5. 
 98. Id. § 5. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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political contributions of over $10,000, United States Corporations would 
need the approval of at least seventy-five percent of both directors and 
shareholders.101 Finally, the Act requires that workforce appointees make 
up at least forty percent of the board of directors.102 
As the effects of such a proposal are largely unknown in the context 
of the United States, Part II of this Note details several prominent 
arguments with premises for and against the Act that have developed from 
the German and Swedish experiences with codetermination. 
II. CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPLICATION TO THE UNITED STATES 
Legal and economic scholars have long debated the merits of both 
the German and Swedish models of codetermination.103 This part presents 
prevailing views rooted in considerations of practical limitations, 
efficiency, and legal obstacles that would likely arise when applied to the 
United States. 
A. PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS 
Practical limitations are based on arguments that challenge the 
structural prerequisites needed to implement codetermination. Because 
many of these arguments are presented as threshold questions, they are 
considered in piecemeal fashion where the remaining analysis is not 
impacted by their hypothetical resolution. 
1. Mandatory vs. Permissive 
One of the most obvious practical limitations is rooted in the 
theoretical “race to the bottom.” 104  Justice Brandeis’ famous theory 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id. § 8. 
 102. Id. § 6. 
 103. See, e.g., J. Bautz Bonanno, Employee Codetermination: Origins in Germany, 
Present Practice in Europe, and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 
947 (1977). 
 104. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558 (1933) (acknowledging the 
race to the bottom theory by stating “companies were early formed to provide charters 
for corporations in states where the cost was lowest and the laws least restrictive”). For 
further development of the theory, see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974). 
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argues that regulatory states are in a constant race to the bottom, wherein 
the regulatory state with the most favorable treatment of corporations is 
the one that will get the most business.105 Though the concept is used most 
commonly to describe Delaware’s attractiveness for corporations, it is 
applicable in the federal regulatory context as well.106 
Accordingly, as a practical matter, a national-level mandate of 
codetermined boards will result in an outflux of corporations.107 That is, 
many companies may pursue opportunistic reincorporation to countries 
with more favorable treatment.108 It is questionable, however, whether a 
substantial number of corporations would expatriate due to the costs 
associated with such swift, drastic action. If the United States enacted 
codetermination legislation and a U.S. company sought to reincorporate 
abroad, it would first need: (1) a majority vote from the codetermined 
board in order to bring the proposal to the shareholders’ vote, and (2) 
shareholder approval for the reincorporation. 109  Additionally, foreign 
nations’ treatment of corporate mobility differs significantly. 110 
Depending on where a company seeks to reincorporate, directors of U.S. 
firms in Europe may face uncertainty regarding choice of law criteria, 
potentially requiring substantial modifications to governance protocols.111 
The reality is that the U.S. market will remain intact, albeit with an altered 
rulebook.112 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 557-58. 
 106. See, e.g., Anita Chan & Robert J S Ross, Racing to the Bottom: International 
Trade Without a Social Clause, 24 THIRD WORLD Q. REP. 1011 (2003). 
 107. This is based on the author’s personal observations. 
 108. See, e.g., Chan, supra note 106, at 1015-16. 
 109. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251. 
 110. See Christiana Panayi, Corporate Mobility in Private International Law and 
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Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 26, 2009). 
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Corporate Law in the U.S. and the E.U. 6 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Working Papers, No. 257, 
2011). 
 112. See, e.g., Billy Melo Araujo, Trade Deals, Labour Conditions and the Gap 
Between Talk and Action, THE CONVERSATION (Sep. 28, 2017, 12:05 PM), http://the 
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83730 [https://perma.cc/BMY5-S47N]. 
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From a normative perspective, a mandatory approach may be the 
only way to effect change.113 The reasoning is rooted in the “race to the 
bottom” theory. 114  If the government took a permissive approach by 
removing all federal law inhibitions and paving the way for individual 
states to pass such regulation, corporations would simply “take refuge” in 
states without a codetermination requirement.115 
Though the internal affairs doctrine usually obliges courts to apply 
the substantive law of a company’s state of incorporation, some states 
instead apply their own substantive law to companies with significant 
business affairs within their jurisdiction. 116  One such example is 
California, which labels companies as quasi-foreign when a majority of 
the shareholders and business exists in California.117 Companies deemed 
to be quasi-foreign are subject to the substantive law of California despite 
being incorporated elsewhere.118 Though some states refuse to accept the 
California standard,119 quasi-foreign classification remains an option for 
states to impose their own requirements on corporations that frequently 
conduct business within their jurisdiction. 
Finally, some experts argue that the lack of voluntary codetermined 
firms in the United States is proof of its inefficiency.120 These normative 
arguments suggest that firms adopt by default the governance 
mechanisms which maximize economic efficiency.121 Accordingly, the 
absence of voluntarily codetermined firms in the U.S. market indicates 
some innate inefficiency that firms choose to avoid.122 If codetermination 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of 
Problems and Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 168 (1982). 
 114. See Cary, supra note 104. 
 115. See Summers, supra note 113, at 157. 
 116. See Mucciarelli, supra note 111, at 38. 
 117. Cal. Corp. Code § 2115. 
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 119. Wilson v. La.-Pac. Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). 
 120. See, e.g., Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Rights and Production 
Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 
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truly allowed firms to become more economically efficient, the U.S. 
market would organically adopt it in order to exploit its benefits.123 
2. Free Market Union Structure 
While the substantive merits of union representation are beyond the 
scope of this Note, it is undisputed that both the Swedish and German 
systems of codetermination rely heavily on the structure of their unions 
as the backbone to support their respective systems of worker 
representation.124 From a practical perspective, a unified system functions 
as the foundation for employees to convene, discuss the issues that are 
important to them, and act as the constituents that board representatives 
are meant to serve.125 
The United States lacks a unified, comprehensive structure for union 
representation, in contrast to the Swedish and German systems.126 In fact, 
studies have found the amount of workers represented by unions has 
dropped from roughly twenty percent to eleven percent since 1983.127 
Though larger firms statistically are more unionized than smaller firms, 
the best predictor of unionization is industry—the steel, electricity, and 
auto industries have historically been among the most heavily 
unionized.128 Because many of the largest companies in the United States 
do not operate in the steel, electricity, and auto industries, a significant 
number of the largest U.S. companies are not unionized.129 Accordingly, 
critics posit that establishing organized unions in the industries that lack 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Summers, supra note 113, at 183. 
 125. Id. at 160, 162. 
 126. Id. at 160. 
 127. U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/ 
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them is an indispensable prerequisite to the successful adoption of 
codetermination.130 
B. EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS 
Most of the debate regarding codetermination’s effectiveness centers 
around whether it has achieved the proposed benefits in the respective 
countries which have adopted it in various forms. This Part presents a 
number of theoretical arguments for and against codetermination’s 
effectiveness. 
1. Influence on the Board 
Critics have long questioned whether codetermination truly succeeds 
in giving workers influence in the boardroom. 131  First, there is the 
question of how board structure can affect worker representatives’ ability 
to influence company policy.132  The dual-board system employed by 
German companies is thought to decrease the amount of influence that 
shareholders have over management.133 Because the management board 
acts as a “buffer” between the supervisory board and day-to-day 
operations, the influence maintained by worker representatives is limited 
to appointing management board members.134 On the other hand, the lack 
of a “buffer” in the Swedish system allows for much stronger stakeholder 
control of management functions.135 
Even if worker representatives have the ability to influence 
management, some scholars claim that a lack of expertise with long-term 
policy decisions typically deliberated at the board level prevents worker 
representatives from having the positive influence they intend to have.136 
Though earlier studies found that worker representatives tend to 
“specialize” in matters that do not have a direct bearing on their roles as 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See Summers, supra note 113, at 158-60. 
 131. See generally Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: 
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 132. See Ringe, supra note 15, at 31-34. 
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worker representatives,137 a 2014 study found that worker representatives 
usually are qualified for their roles. 138  Notably, out of 229 worker 
representatives considered, not a single one was found to be less than 
qualified for their role.139 
Under a game theory approach, Professor John Coffee argues that 
the introduction of worker representatives creates an unstable 
“multiplayer game” which results in a net decrease of control over 
management.140  While the game previously consisted of a one-player 
paradigm, the added representatives create an unstable scenario where all 
sides will try to play off each other and, thus, “the locus of power and 
authority within the corporation is less certain.”141 However, scholars 
often question the existence of this instability, as Germany has operated 
with the system for decades.142 Coffee argues that as the multiplayer game 
is repeated over time, the parties involved create coalitions that result in 
long-term stability for firms.143 
2. Increased Costs 
Scholars posit that adopting codetermination will result in a net 
increase in operating costs. 144  Theoretically, this newly-established 
“heterogeneity of interests”—as opposed to the unilateral system of board 
and management—will increase both the costs of decision-making and 
the agency costs related to overseeing management.145 
By having anything other than a unilaterally-operated board, firms 
will have to expend additional funds when making important decisions, 
since more interests need to be taken into account to get the necessary 
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votes.146 Even in systems without quasi-parity codetermination, worker 
representatives have the opportunity to “hold up” board proceedings by 
voicing their opinions, which takes up time and results in increased 
opportunity costs. 147  Such a diversity of interests is also thought to 
increase agency costs, as “it will be more difficult for a . . . board of 
diverse and conflicting interests to monitor management.” 148 
Accordingly, mandatory codetermination may lead to increased agency 
costs for firms. 
3. Effects on Firm Performance 
While a number of studies extract empirical data regarding the 
effects of German codetermination on firm performance, the findings are 
varied and, oftentimes, conflicting.149 The data supports the conclusion 
that both quasi-parity and non-parity codetermination 150  have had a 
modest, if any, impact on firm performance in the affected sectors and 
firms.151 
The effects on worker authority and influence have been more 
pronounced. The previously mentioned 2014 study found links between 
quasi-parity codetermination and job security. 152  After periods of 
economic shock, firms with quasi-parity codetermined boards 
demonstrated a three-percent decrease in wage levels, but, more notably, 
a thirteen-percent difference in employment when compared to similar 
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 147. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 91. 
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 149. See L. Fauver & M.E. Fuerst, Employee Representatives and Good Corporate 
Governance, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 673, 689 (2006). 
 150. Quasi-parity codetermination refers to firms where half of the board is made up 
of worker representatives, while non-parity codetermination refers to firms for which less 
than half of the board is made up of worker representatives. 
 151. See id.; see also Bernd Frick & Erik Lehman, Corporate Governance in 
Germany: Ownership, Codetermination, and Firm Performance in a Stakeholder 
Economy, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LABOUR MANAGEMENT: AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON § 2.2 (Howard Gospel & Andrew Pendleton eds., 2004).  
But see Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of 
German Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N. 863, 885 (2004) (finding that equal 
representation has a negative effect on firm value because it decreases the market-to-
book ratio of firms). 
 152. See Kim, supra note 138. 
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firms without it.153 Parity-codetermined boards use their influence as an 
insurance mechanism, specifically when they agree to take on lower 
wages in exchange for higher job security.154 
C. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. National Registry: Preemption and Constitutionality 
From a practical perspective, scholars posit that a national registry is 
the most effective means to impose and enforce codetermination 
requirements in the United States. 155  Critics take issue with the 
constitutionality of wealth redistribution 156  and that the registry’s 
requirements frequently would preempt state corporate law.157 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge argues that empowering a federal 
registry to enforce nationally-mandated requirements on companies runs 
contrary to precedent set by the United States Supreme Court.158 He posits 
that “a fair rule of thumb is that state law is concerned with the substance 
of corporate governance, while federal law is concerned with disclosure 
and a limited number of procedural aspects of corporate governance.”159 
Furthermore, he points to several instances where the Supreme Court held 
that state corporate laws are not preempted by federal securities laws.160 
These types of preemption arguments are questionable, as Congress has a 
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broad set of powers to regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause of 
the United States Constitution.161 
Conservative outlets have been quick to point out constitutional 
challenges that can be brought against the wealth redistributing goals of 
the national registry (and codetermination generally).162 They argue that 
the wealth to be redistributed from shareholders to workers and other 
minority stakeholders would constitute a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.163 
Although a taking typically involves the government’s physical 
confiscation or invasion of private property by the government, a taking 
of both real and personal property can also occur when a federal 
regulation overreaches. 164  These cases are referred to as “regulatory 
takings.” 165  A key inquiry in takings jurisprudence is the level of 
economic destruction that directly results from the government’s 
regulatory imposition.166 Though courts usually consider compensation in 
cases with eighty-five percent or greater diminution in value, there is no 
guarantee that compensation will be awarded.167 
It is worth noting that the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) upheld the validity of codetermination in 
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1979 when it faced what was essentially a taking claim.168 The main issue 
in the proceeding was whether codetermination interfered with the 
interests of the company. 169  While the way a company is managed 
certainly affects shareholder value, the court held that the legislature, in 
pursuit of its socioeconomic goals, was justified in limiting certain rights 
of individuals.170 
2. Conflict of Interest, Stakeholder View 
A fundamental principle of U.S. corporate law is that corporate 
directors owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders. 171  Given that 
directors are held to such high standards of loyalty and care toward 
shareholders, classifying workers as directors could cause a conflict of 
interest in the board room.172 Worker-directors would find themselves in 
an “impossible position” because of the conflicting interests they would 
be bound to serve.173 As appointed worker representatives, they would 
owe a duty to serve the interests of the workers, but as directors, they 
would owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders.174 
On the other hand, American legal scholar Clyde Summers asserts 
that arguments proposing such a conflict of interest are flawed because 
they rely on the “unarticulated premise that stockholders are the 
corporation, and undivided loyalty is owed to the stockholders.” 175 
Though the classic view of corporate purpose is shareholder value 
maximization, there is a contemporary trend toward believing that 
corporations ought to consider the interests of persons other than 
shareholders.176 If this shift in the conception of corporate purpose occurs, 
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the proposed conflict of interest ceases to exist, as board members would 
be bound to take on a more holistic view.177 
The past few decades have seen a mounting interest around 
stakeholder-centered theories of corporate governance, many of which 
advance the idea that workers and other minority shareholders are worthy 
of consideration in the boardroom.178 Generally, workers do not invest in 
companies in the traditional sense by acquiring stock.179 They make firm-
specific “human capital” investments, however, through the opportunity 
costs they take on by working for a specific company.180 These human 
capital investments, which are largely undiversified, include relocating to 
remote places in order to work at factories, and learning how to use 
proprietary machinery or technology, among others.181 
Accordingly, prominent legal experts posit that these firm-specific 
investments, which are so vital to the successful operation of companies, 
deem the interests of workers and other minority stakeholders worthy of 
consideration in the boardroom. 182  The Accountable Capitalism Act 
compounds this view by extending a fiduciary duty to workers, 
consumers, and other minority stakeholders. 183  By doing so, the Act 
indirectly eliminates the potential conflict of interest recognized by 
Summers.184 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR TRANSPLANT 
Because it is unlikely that companies would adopt a system of 
codetermination voluntarily, this Note argues that the only way to achieve 
a systematic widespread adoption of codetermination in the United States 
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is through federal legislation compelling systems of codetermination.185 
Though worker representation may offer certain efficiency benefits, it is 
likely directly in conflict with directors’ mandated duty to increase 
shareholder value.186 The lower average of Tobin’s Q in Germany and 
Sweden suggests that the introduction of codetermination regulation 
could lead to a decrease in the value of corporate ownership.187 Thus, 
codetermination not only represents a significant transfer of power, but it 
promises a drastic redistribution of wealth.188 
Moreover, it is crucial that such a mandate comes from the federal 
level, rather than using states as experimental vehicles. 189  Should 
individual states adopt mandatory requirements, companies could flee to 
reincorporate in states without such requirements. 
By the same logic, some scholars argue that a federal mandate would 
result in many companies leaving the United States to reincorporate in 
foreign jurisdictions.190 This argument is unconvincing, as it relies on 
short-termism and does not factor in long-term adaptation to legislative 
changes. In the long run, the market will adapt to these requirements as 
companies continue to operate and compete with this new set of rules. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in 2002, is illustrative of a lack of 
reincorporation following sweeping regulatory changes. 191  Sarbanes-
Oxley set in motion several sweeping regulatory changes, including 
mandatory independent audit committees and the establishment of 
director liability for accuracy of financial statements. 192  These 
requirements, though substantially different than their predecessors, are 
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simply part of the current legislative landscape. 193  A worker 
representation requirement would be no different. 
The lack of a comprehensive union system is a valid concern for 
nation-wide application.194 There seems to be no way to completely avoid 
the logistical and overhead costs associated with applying worker 
representation to non-unionized industries. 195  Instead of categorically 
imposing the requirement on all companies with over $1 billion in profits, 
the relevant legislation could integrate a set of tax incentives to increase 
unionization in industries which are not presently unionized. Though this 
option would give companies a buffer period to roll out the regulatory 
changes, the extent of the costs that such a shift places on companies is 
unknown. In sum, it seems that some sort of union or quasi-union 
structure is desirable in order to successfully phase in worker 
representation in the United States.196 
Because so much of this debate turns on efficiency, the results from 
contemporary empirical studies conducted in Germany particularly are 
persuasive. 197  While there are many valid and convincing arguments 
suggesting losses in efficiency measures when boards are codetermined, 
it is worth noting that the relevant German studies did not find any 
significant decreases in traditional measures of firm value.198 Therefore, 
codetermination succeeds in empowering the work force to pursue goals 
that they value, while also allowing shareholders to benefit from corporate 
ownership. 
As Senator Warren’s Act prescribes, maintaining a single-board 
structure is likely the most efficient option for the United States.199 A 
switch to a dual-board system ultimately would be an unnecessary 
endeavor because the technical distinction between board structures tends 
to blur in practice and the degree of control exercised over management 
is largely attributed to the discipline achieved in the corporate 
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hierarchy.200  A system with a close nexus of control is preferable in 
newly-adopting countries because it ensures that workers receive the 
baseline level of influence the system promises.201 
The majority of proposed legal challenges either are poorly 
developed or completely miss the mark.202 While it is true that federal law 
has previously been found not to preempt state securities law, this does 
not preclude the application of worker representation per se.203 To begin 
with, there has been a recent shift toward the expansion of federal 
regulatory power in relation to corporate governance.204 Moreover, the 
preemption doctrine is rooted in the concept that “matters that can be 
adequately handled by states should be left to them; matters that cannot 
be so handled should be undertaken by the federal government.”205 Be 
that as it may, this is clearly a matter that cannot and has not been 
adequately handled by states. 
While critics would surely bring taking claims against the 
government under the Fifth Amendment, their likelihood of success is 
relatively low. In order to be compensated for a regulatory taking, a 
claimant must clearly demonstrate a particular level of economic 
destruction resulting directly from the government’s regulatory 
imposition.206 At this point, any proposed challenge is merely speculating 
at the level of “destruction” that imposing codetermination would cause. 
Even if such an imposition resulted in a marked diminution in value, 
courts have been hesitant to grant relief in taking claims even when the 
diminution in value has exceeded ninety percent.207 
The arguments under the stakeholder theory acknowledge one 
weakness in the regulatory changes proposed in Senator Warren’s Act. A 
fiduciary duty ought to extend to employees in order to avoid conflicts of 
interest while also affording them protections as largely undiversified 
investors of human capital. Legislation, however, should err on the side 
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of caution and avoid extending these duties to other minority 
stakeholders. From an efficiency standpoint, minority stakeholders, like 
the environment and consumers, are better protected through regulations 
and contract, respectively. 
CONCLUSION 
Codetermination represents a drastic departure from the current 
principles and ambitions that dominate contemporary U.S. society. If 
policymakers decide that codetermination is the appropriate path for the 
United States, any legislation should be federal and compulsory, and a 
unitary board structure maintained. While expanding a fiduciary duty to 
all stakeholders may be theoretically sound, the reality is that aside from 
workers, most other stakeholders are best protected by other means. 
Though decades of European experience provide some insight into 
the possible economic effects codetermination could have in the United 
States, it would be unrealistic to expect an identical result, and unwise to 
rely solely on a statistical analysis of its effects. Instead, we should focus 
on the type of socioeconomic values we want to cultivate. By establishing 
parameters which favor principles of economic democracy, mandated 
worker representation is a means to further the interests of stakeholders 
other than corporate shareholders. 
Because the effects of this sweeping legislative proposal are largely 
unpredictable, it is clear that they should be addressed through further 
research and constructive debate. 
